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Abstract 
In a catastrophic incident gaining situational aware-
ness (SA) is the foremost prerequisite that enables re-
sponders to save and sustain lives, stabilize the incident, 
and protect the environment and property from further 
damage. However, catastrophes severely damage and 
disrupt critical infrastructures including response assets. 
Initially and for days and even weeks, essential infor-
mation remains incomplete, unverified, and is changing 
as the catastrophic incident unfolds, all of which leads to 
a distorted common operating picture (COP). The lack of 
clear and comprehensive SA/COP prevents incident com-
manders from efficiently directing the response effort. 
This study reports on the challenges emergency respond-
ers faced with regard to situational awareness in a recent 
large-scale exercise under the name of Cascadia Rising 
2016 (CR16) conducted in the Pacific Northwest of the 
United States. The exercise involved a total of 23,000 ac-
tive participants. Over four days in June of 2016, CR16 
simulated the coordinated response to a rupture of the 
800-mile Cascadia Subduction Zone resulting in a mag-
nitude-9 earthquake and tsunami similar to the cata-
strophic incident in Eastern Japan in 2011. Responders 
at all levels were severely challenged, and the exercise 
revealed major vulnerabilities in critical infrastructures. 
Situational awareness was very difficult to establish. 
1. Introduction  
Around the late 1980s and early 1990s geological re-
searchers increasingly discovered indicators and evi-
dence for the potential occurrence of magnitude 8 to 9.5 
earthquakes in the Pacific Northwest of the North Amer-
ican continent [5, 13, 26, 46]. In the course of these stud-
ies, it became clear that such megathrusts had reoccurred 
with relative regularity every 350 years over the past 
8,000 years, the latest of which could be exactly dated to 
January 26, 1700 at about 2100 hours local time [24, 29]. 
After the scientific evidence had emerged, profes-
sional responders in the area had begun planning and pre-
paring for responding to the “big one” fairly early, 
whereas the general public in the potentially affected ar-
eas did not take much notice of the likely threat until the 
devastating Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami had 
happened in Eastern Japan in March of 2011 [16, 17, 32]. 
The US Department of Homeland Security and its Home-
land Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center com-
missioned a simulation study (the so-called HITRAC 
study) the same year, which estimated in great detail the 
potential impact of a magnitude-9 earthquake and tsunami 
on the Pacific Northwest as a result of a complete rupture 
in the Cascadia subduction zone [1]. With the results of the 
HITRAC study in hand, the need for a major effort in plan-
ning and preparedness had become painfully clear to offi-
cials and professional responders alike. A year after the 
catastrophe in Japan, the local newspaper Seattle Times 
then alerted the public that for the “Puget Sound and the 
Pacific Coast, the basic earthquake question is when, not 
if” [2]. The Cascadia Rising 2016 Exercise, which in-
volved a total of 23,000 participants from responder agen-
cies of all levels in three Federal States (Oregon, Wash-
ington, and Idaho), the FEMA Region X, as well as the 
Military, was the acknowledgement of both the urgency of 
the need to prepare and the severity of the threat [3]. 
As stated in a previous study, “[r]esponse efforts on 
this scale are extremely complex undertakings, and they 
require enormous managerial, operational, and tactical 
skills on part of the responders” [30, p 2498] A cata-
strophic incident of the scale, scope, and duration of a 
complete Cascadia Subduction Zone rupture has not been 
recorded in recent history. The zipper-like rupture from 
one end of the subduction line to the other is expected to 
occur along the 800-mile-long subduction line resulting 
in five to six minutes of violent shaking impacting areas 
up to 100 miles away. A 30 to 40-foot high tsunami would 
reach the coastline about 20 to 30 minutes after the rup-
ture. Several aftershocks of significant magnitude would 
be expected to follow the initial rupture inflicting more 
damage on the already heavily compromised and im-
pacted infrastructure. According to the aforementioned 
HITRAC study, once this particular incident unfolded, it 
would likely inflict a major toll in terms of human lives 
lost and humans severely injured; it would also destroy 
critical and non-critical infrastructure alike. The impact 
on human lives and infrastructure would be the greater 
the closer the location to the coastline in the West ranging 
from severe damage throughout the so-called Interstate-5 
corridor to almost total annihilation along the Western 







shorelines. Power outages would be widespread and 
lasting up to a year, or even longer. The impacted areas 
West of the Cascadian Mountain range would be inac-
cessible by ground transport or sea transport for ex-
tended periods of time leaving the engulfed populations 
and the local responders to mainly their own means of 
support and response for up to two to three weeks. Relief 
would first come predominantly by air transport. Re-
sponders would find themselves stripped from using 
most modern information and communication technolo-
gies for the lack of power and intact communication in-
frastructures. Sustained communication infrastructures 
such as satellite phones or HAM (amateur) radio would 
provide only relatively low bandwidths, particularly, in 
data communications. Low-tech technologies such as T 
cards and other paper-based methods would be the tools 
of necessity for an extended period of time. Responders’ 
“situational awareness” as the basis of a shared “com-
mon operating picture” would be hard to establish for at 
least the first couple of weeks after the incident.  
An earlier empirical study had shown in detail how 
accurate and reliable information was the “most im-
portant and most scarce resource in early disaster re-
sponse” [30, p. 2498]. The study’s focus was the March 
2014 SR530/Oso landslide in Washington State, which 
was declared a national disaster. Many, if not most, re-
sponders and agencies involved in the real response of 
2014 participated in the CR16 exercise two years later.  
Quite a few responders who had been interviewed for 
the SR530/Oso landslide study were willing to be inter-
viewed again after the CR16 exercise providing an ex-
cellent frame of reference. Other responders and exer-
cise planners from several levels of government were 
also interviewed. Furthermore, along with the interview 
transcripts the study analyzed the after-action reports 
from 23 responder agencies. The overall methodology, 
the theoretical framework, the interview instrument, and 
the ex-ante codebook, and other tools used for this study 
were largely similar to those used in the earlier study. 
This paper is one of two publications from a study 
dedicated to situational awareness during a simulated 
catastrophic incident response; while the other paper co-
vers the communication- and technology-related chal-
lenges in the context, this paper focuses on challenges 
of information sharing and of practically attaining situa-
tional awareness among responders regardless of the 
technological underpinnings. Unlike the previous study, 
which studied the inter-responder information sharing 
challenges and related SA/SSA challenges of a local dis-
aster of limited scope, scale, and duration, this study at-
tempts to understand, how these challenges change un-
der the impact of a catastrophic disaster, which engulfs 
a large geographic area with large scope and scale and 
long duration. 
The paper is organized as follows: First, the academic 
literature on situational awareness during incident re-
sponses is reviewed followed by a presentation of the re-
sulting research questions and the methodology section. 
Subsequently, the study findings are detailed leading to 
the discussion of insights from the findings. At last, con-
clusions are drawn, and the directions for future research 
on the subject are sketched out.  
2. Literature Review 
The academic literature has highlighted the indispen-
sable role of actionable and integrated information in dis-
aster response [9, 23, 34]. Based on this particular type of 
information, (individual) situational awareness (SA) 
leading to shared (group or team) situational awareness 
(SSA) can effectively be developed among responders, 
which then serves as a prerequisite for generating and 
maintaining a shared common operating picture (COP) 
[8, 9, 15, 34], ). Both SA/SSA and a shared COP are foun-
dational to any mission and any well-directed and effec-
tive response [14]. However, despite their extraordinary 
importance to the success of disaster response and early 
recovery, systematic study of SA and SSA advanced in 
other academic fields such as Behavioral Science, Human 
Factors Research, and Safety Sciences, particularly, in the 
context of the military, far earlier and much faster than in 
Disaster Science. As an example, Endsley presented a 
comprehensive SA framework, in which she distin-
guished (1) perception, (2) comprehension, and (3) pro-
jection as three intertwined levels of SA [8]. The Endsley 
framework, which was first developed in the context of 
military combat aviation, has been found the most influ-
ential theoretical contribution to the understanding of SA 
and SSA [27]. The framework, however, despite its pop-
ularity and wide acceptance has been criticized for its al-
leged linearity, its lack of accounting for inter-level feed-
back relationships as well as for an unclear distinction be-
tween SA product(s) and SA process(es) [27, 38, 39, 43]. 
In a detailed rejoinder Endsley refuted these criticisms as 
mainly misunderstandings  and misconceptions [9]. Crit-
ics of Endsley’s approach to SA and SSA have proposed 
the concept of “Distributed Situation Awareness” (DSA) 
as an alternative [39, 40], which claimed to employ a sys-
tem-theoretical perspective. "DSA is considered to be ac-
tivated knowledge for a specific task within a system at a 
specific time by specific agents, that is, the human and 
nonhuman actors in a system" [39, p. 47]. The inclusion 
of technology or information artifacts into the DSA 
framework as nonhuman “actors” has drawn serious crit-
icism itself [9]. In DSA, nonhuman “actors” have been 
portrayed as triggering and informing each other, thus 
along with human actors representing the activated 
knowledge within the network; however, as Endsley 
pointed out, it would still always need a human actor to 




the interaction to make it an instance of SA. In terms of 
DSA it has also remained unclear, what exactly the “sys-
tem” is, and what its identifiable system boundaries 
might be. In other words, no clear system definition has 
been found regarding what is considered part of or ele-
ment inside the system, and what is not. 
As pointed out before, in Disaster Sciences the no-
tion of and discussion about SA/SSA was informed and 
influenced by advances in other disciplines, which over 
time have mainly adopted the Endsley framework [15, 
22, 28, 35-37]. However, upon reviewing government 
documents on the subject as to when professional re-
sponders had gained “full” SSA in the early stages of a 
response to a major incident, the point in time when SSA 
was fully established appears to be somewhat in the eye 
of the beholder. For example, an official commission re-
port on the response to a recent landslide disaster in 
Washington State claimed that SA was established after 
“several hours” [21], while other documentation on the 
same incident stated that, in fact, SA was not fully es-
tablished for “several days” [30]. This substantial dis-
crepancy in views (“hours” versus “days”) demonstrates 
that what establishes, or what “is,” situation awareness 
is still not well enough articulated. While the commis-
sion report might correctly refer to the SSA level of 
“perception,” which was assumed after “hours,” the 
other official documentation undoubtedly refers to the 
SSA level of “comprehension,” also indicated by read-
justments in the response mentioned in the document, 
which indeed took several days.  
In other words, research needs to address in more de-
tail, which level of SSA is investigated, and how the 
three levels of SSA transition from one another (includ-
ing feedback), which may, for example, include granular 
computational approaches [20]. A recent experimental 
study found evidence that “enriched” information, that 
is, summarized information rather than providing raw 
data enhanced responders’ SSA, and hence, would im-
prove the effectiveness of a response [45]. 
In contrast, strong hindrances to attaining even the 
entry level of SSA (perception) were also identified in 
the absence of planning  and preconfiguring so-called 
“Essential Elements of Information” (EEIs), which are 
itemized lists of assets and critical infrastructure that 
help  guide responders systematically through the col-
lection of detailed and hazard-specific information [30, 
36]. Furthermore, a lack of standardization of infor-
mation sharing procedures and protocols impeded all 
levels of SSA and prevented the necessary integration of 
information from different sources, which it was argued 
could be overcome by a unified disaster information ar-
chitecture and a unified system platform shared by re-
sponders at all levels [30, 35, 36]. Information infra-
structures, which cater professional responders’ specific 
information needs, support their information behavior, 
and facilitate the vertical and horizontal information 
flows between and among them, have been characterized 
as prerequisites for developing and maintaining SA/SSA 
and  a shared COP, which in turn makes possible an ef-
fective response [30, 32-34]. 
In summary, while emergencies and non-catastrophic 
disasters present a number of known and not so known 
challenges, the challenges to inter-responder information 
sharing along the three dimensions of specific infor-
mation needs, information seeking behaviors, and infor-
mation flows under the impact of a catastrophe and se-
verely compromised information infrastructures are not 
clearly understood. Likewise, it is little known what spe-
cific challenges ensue for responders from the impact of 
a catastrophe and severely compromised information in-
frastructures with regard to the three levels of SA/SSA 
(perception, comprehension, and projection). 
3. Research Questions 
This then leads to the following two research ques-
tions, which address the identified gap in understanding 
of information-sharing and SA/SSA challenges: 
Research Question #1 (RQ#1): 
 What are specific information-sharing challenges for 
professional responders in a catastrophic incident re-
sponse? 
Research Question #2 (RQ#2): 
 What are specific SA/SSA-related challenges for 
professional responders in a catastrophic incident re-
sponse? 
4. Method Section  
Theoretical Lens. This study implements the so-called 
“information perspective.” At its core this perspective is 
human actor and human action-centric, and it views in-
formation and communication technologies (ICTs) as fa-
cilitators of human information needs, information be-
haviors, and information flows. Human actors’ (here: re-
sponders’) information behavior and the information 
flows between them depend on so-called information in-
frastructures, which encompass formal and informal, or-
ganizational, technological, and social elements among 
others [32, 34]. In disaster management, when looking at 
the technological elements, ICTs as part of the infor-
mation infrastructures have assumed important roles [7, 
18] by providing high-quality, mission-critical, timely, 
and actionable information to responders in typically fast 
and dynamically changing environments [18, 19, 42]). On 
the downside, ICTs have also been found contributing to 
information overload, work overload, and other stressors 
to responders in disaster responses [9]. The information 
perspective allows a detailed investigation of actions and 




existing and emerging information infrastructures and 
their various elements. 
Instrument and Coding Scheme. Based on the theo-
retical lens, that is, the conceptual framework of resilient 
information infrastructures (RIIs) [34] a semi-structured 
interview protocol was devised upfront, which covered 
five topical areas of (1) management and organization, 
(2) technology, (3) information, (4) information infra-
structure, and (5) RIIs/resiliency. The instrument admin-
istered was a shortened and adjusted version of the in-
strument used in a previous study [30, 31]. A total of 
twenty-five interview questions plus respective probes 
were incorporated.  
Sample. The sample was purposive [25] and in-
cluded responders from eight different groups: the (1) 
City Emergency Operations Centers, (2) County Emer-
gency Operations Centers, (3) Washington State Emer-
gency Management Division, (4) WA State Agencies, 
(5) Health Districts, (6) Regional Aviation, (7) Wash-
ington State National Guard, and (8) Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), region X. A total of 17 
individuals were interviewed. Furthermore, after-action 
reports (AARs) from 23 agencies from all eight re-
sponder groups were collected. 
Data collection: Whereas the CR16 exercise was 
undertaken in June of 2016, the interviews were con-
ducted in person between September 2016 and March 
2017 and lasted between 33 to 107 minutes. Two inter-
views were conducted via Skype video conferencing. 
All interviews were audio taped, transcribed, and coded 
by at least two coders for analysis. During the interviews 
also notes were taken and participant interaction was ob-
served and recorded. Moreover, besides after-action re-
ports other documents such as press interviews were col-
lected, reviewed, and coded as appropriate.  
Data analysis and coding: The initial codebook by 
following the aforementioned conceptual RII frame-
work [34] contained six category codes (one for each 
topical area) and 141 sub-category codes. Additional 
codes were inductively introduced during data collec-
tion, in individual coding sessions, and inter-coder ses-
sions [11, 12, 41, 44]. Since in a hybrid approach of de-
ductive and inductive analyses [10] a codebook is de-
signed to be open to extension, it ultimately encom-
passed 176 sub-category codes in the aforementioned 
six main categories. 
At least two researchers coded each transcript and 
document by means of a cloud-based software tool for 
qualitative and mixed-method data analyses (Dedoose 
main versions 7 and 8, dedoose.com). The coded data 
were compared one by one and demonstrated high inter-
coder reliability. 
When analyzing the code frequency table, the highest 
counts of code applications were found in the areas of 
“management and organization” (2,763), “information” 
(1,705), and “technology” (1,111). For the purpose of the 
specific analysis on situational awareness-related infor-
mation needs, information behaviors, and information 
flows the code intersection represented by the sub-codes 
of “situational awareness,” “address challenges of infor-
mation sharing,” and “use of information and communi-
cation technologies for information sharing” was se-
lected, which produced 1,558 excerpts. 
For the most part, these excerpts were between two 
and three paragraphs in length. They were clustered by 
responder teams and then analyzed for emerging concepts 
in a grounded fashion. Recurring concepts and main 
themes were identified and labeled through keywords and 
key phrases. All excerpt clusters were concept-analyzed 
by at least two analysts, in most cases by three analysts, 
as well as by the principal investigator. The coded con-
cepts were checked for inter-analyst validity and a con-
vergence of interpretation was found. Converging con-
cepts were identified and transferred to the “canvas” of a 
cloud-based mapping tool (CMAP, version 6.03).  
After reconciling the remaining inter-analyst dis-
crepancies in interpretation as much as appropriate, the 
reconciled concepts were also transferred to the canvas. 
The concept clusters were inspected and sorted into topi-
cal “bins” or “buckets,” in which chronological, logical, 
and other non-causal relationships were identified. 
 
Figure 1 Sample CMAP (Concept Mapping for Information 
Sharing at the EMD Responder Group) including researchers’ 
concept cluster markings 
Whenever evidence from the data supported it, rela-
tionship links between concepts were established, which 
were not interpreted as causal links. 
Research team and processes. The research team 
consisted of the principal investigator (PI) and more than 




project both for-credit and voluntary. The PI and RAs 
worked individually and in small teams to transcribe, 
code, conceptually/contextually analyze, and finally 
map the concepts. The research team met weekly in per-
son or online and communicated via the research project 
site and the project listserv as well as via individual face-
to-face and group meetings. All weekly meetings were 
streamed and recorded, which kept the whole research 
team in sync over extended periods of time. 
5. Findings 
5.1 Ad research question #1 (What are specific 
information-sharing challenges for professional re-
sponders in a catastrophic incident response?): 
 As mentioned before, this publication is the one of 
two from a single study on the various challenges to re-
sponders’ situational awareness. The other paper pre-
sents technology and communication-related aspects of 
the subject under investigation. Therefore, in this paper 
the focus lies on to the non-technological aspects of in-
formation-sharing challenges. As shown there, in the 
real-case response to this particular simulated cata-
strophic incident modern technologies will for the most 
part be unavailable due the complete loss of electrical 
power for an extended period of time, which will gravely 
affect the response. Along these lines, a technology-nes-
cient analysis of responders’ information-sharing chal-
lenges is necessary and justified. Even if electrical 
power, and with it modern information and communica-
tion technologies (ICTs), had remained at responders’ 
disposal, the systemic problems reported in the follow-
ing would have persisted.  
Lack of Standardized Information Flows, Protocols, 
and Flow Frequencies. Responders on all levels be-
wailed the absence of clear-cut definitions and prescrip-
tions of what information had to go where, when, in 
what frequency, in what format, and at what level of de-
tail. The information needs of horizontally and vertically 
working response units were unclear, or, at least, not 
clearly known. There was no standardized push mecha-
nism nor any standardized pull mechanism for sharing 
information between responder units, even within the 
same jurisdictions. As a City after-action report (AAR) 
laconically states,  
“Neither the TCC <Transportation Coordination 
Center, insertion by authors> or <sic!> EOC 
<Emergency Operations Center, insertion by au-
thors> has <sic!> guidelines on how and when to 
share information.” (quote #01), 
And a County AAR adds, 
“The establishment of regional situational aware-
ness/common operating picture (SA/ COP) was 
not achieved due to inconsistent protocols and in-
complete processes, as well as the lack of an 
effective and established common mechanism for 
sharing SA/COP information.” (quote #02) 
Just using the standard ICS213 message form 
(https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/docu-
ments/33548, retrieved May 31, 2018) would not meet this 
particular need, since it only specifies the elements of 
basic messaging, but it does not specify any (vertical/hor-
izontal) procedures, pathways nor protocols about pro-
cesses, frequencies, nor reception notifications of point-to-
point message exchanges and distribution among a num-
ber of other issues. In addition, message exchanges with 
the military are in need of specification, the latter of which, 
however, appears to be working between FEMA and other 
federal agencies. 
Information Sources, Information Needs, and Infor-
mation Overload/Overflow. Besides the problem of iden-
tifying the adequate lists and paths for distribution of im-
portant information to recipients with a need to know, in-
versely responders found it also difficult to identify the ad-
equate sources of information, when in need. As presented 
below this problem has been addressed in part via devel-
oping checklists known as hazard-specific “Essential Ele-
ments of Information” by some jurisdictions. However, to 
what extent the information has to be pulled from respec-
tive recipients, and to what extent it is to be pushed on to 
recipients, needs further consideration. In particular, quite 
many responders found themselves overwhelmed by the 
amount of data shared with them. As a FEMA responder 
explains, 
“People at that point are just collecting infor-
mation, they're coming in, and there is so much of 
it, it's how do you synthesize what is really im-
portant versus not. So that's what I would look at 
for trying to find out really what is the life-saving 
issues are about. There's also, what is going to 
bring, what is the information that we need to know 
that's going to bring the greatest impact for re-
sponse and restoration?” (quote #03) 
Information Inconsistencies, Obsolescence, Vetting, 
and Information Sharing Anxieties. In a turbulent and even 
chaotic information landscape like in the response to a cat-
astrophic incident, information is incomplete, ambiguous, 
and even contradictory. The vetting, deconflicting, and 
verification process, however, can be time consuming. Re-
sponders strongly tended to pass on only vetted infor-
mation, which had the positive effect of preventing ill-
guided responses, but it also came at the expense of poten-
tially valuable time lost through the verification process. 
In quite a number of instances, information was found ob-
soleted even before the vetting was complete. As a result, 
some responder groups (even inside EOCs and ECCs) ap-
peared as having developed a reluctance to sharing infor-
mation beyond their own functional needs, or for other rea-
sons, for example, the police for security reasons, and 




appropriate use of the information, the latter of which ex-
tended to not sharing all information with elected offi-
cials or external stakeholders. This kind of information 
siloing has also been observed and described elsewhere 
[6]. As a City responder illustrates, 
“<Police and Fire, insertion authors> will have 
the quickest eye on the street than anybody. So, 
trying to get that information from them, for ex-
ample, the police department treats some other 
information as security-sensitive, and they won't 
even share it, which is just kind of a problem, 
and I'm not sure, why it is, especially in the case 
of disaster. So, the fatality, we were collecting 
information from the fire department, but they 
were actually collecting the raw data by them-
selves.” (quote #04) 
As the quote shows, information siloing leads to a re-
duplication of information collection efforts requiring 
further verification and deconflicting. 
Impacts of Shift Changes and Physical Separation. In 
quite a number of cases, shift changes were found a 
missed opportunity for effective information sharing be-
tween responders. Be it for reasons of fatigue, lack of 
planning or protocol, or other reasons, not every im-
portant information including the common operating pic-
ture (COP) was relayed from one shift to the next, so that 
costly double work resulted, and valuable response time 
was lost. As another State responder describes the shift 
change, 
“But, that <i.e, handing over a chronological log 
of events, insertion by authors> in itself is not 
helpful in sharing information, sharing situa-
tional awareness, or sharing a common operating 
picture, because I do not want to have to read 
through a thread of 200 events from the previous 
shift to get an idea of what the current situation 
is.” (quote #05) 
Some jurisdictions practiced shift overlaps, which 
significantly helped mitigate the information loss upon 
shift change. In some other cases, also the physical sepa-
ration, for example, of the Geographical Information Sys-
tems unit and other EOC stations and units led to the loss 
of information or to a lack of distribution. 
Terminology as well as Format and Media Breaks. 
Information sharing was hampered or slowed down, 
whenever responders used incompatible terminologies 
including acronyms. Communication in plainest lan-
guage omitting any specific lingo elements was found 
most conducive to effective information sharing. Also, 
slowdowns occurred when media and document formats 
differed, or were incompatible. This issue would need at-
tention beyond the use of ICTs. In the real incident, when 
ICTs are unavailable through the loss of power, it would 
be a necessity to have standard document formats (such 
as the twenty-one forms published in FEMA’s Incident 
Command System forms booklet, 
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-
1922-25045-7047/ics_forms_12_7_10.pdf, retrieved May 
31, 2018) available on paper. More importantly, as soon as 
ICTs in the process of weeks and even months gradually 
become available again the transition between paper-based 
response management and ICT-based response manage-
ment needs to be practiced. According to a responder, at 
the State level, this particular requirement has been identi-
fied, 
“We've even gone to the extent of that form, this In-
cident Snapshot, is available as a paper form. It 
can be filled out in WebEOC providing that the ju-
risdiction has access to WebEOC, and the other 
thing, we've also done, we've created this as a tem-
plate that amateur radio communicators can com-
municate on behalf of the local jurisdiction via am-
ateur radio.” (quote #06) 
5.2 Ad research question #2 (What are specific 
SA/SSA-related challenges for professional responders 
in a catastrophic incident response?): 
 Reliance on Trustworthy Channels, Quickness of In-
formation Collection, and Issues of Verification. As 
shown in the literature review, the criticality of assuming 
shared SA and COP quickly is well understood in both 
academic theory and practice. However, as seen in the 
previous section on information sharing a standardized 
process for exchanging information was missing. The 
same holds true for the information vetting and verifica-
tion process leading to SSA/COP. During CR16 much in-
formation was collected through informal channels, and 
the trustworthiness of the exchanged information rested 
on the trust that was pre-established between sender and 
receiver rather than the message content itself, or other 
criteria and indicators of veracity (such as verification 
through own first responders, photographs from inde-
pendent sources, live video from aircraft, and the involve-
ment of subject matter experts, etc.).  
During the exercise collecting information was not 
quick (as will not be during the real incident), which led 
to a SSA/COP that was slow in coming. Adding to this, 
whenever information was acquired through other than 
internal or trusted external sources, the information was 
duly scrutinized and vetted before it was compiled into 
the bigger SSA/COP. As stated before, while time-con-
suming, this process was followed to prevent undue re-
sponses at the expense of delays. However, in quite a few 
instances, response efforts were carried out even before a 
better SSA/COP was secured. The exercise clearly 
demonstrated that SSA/COP would not be established 
easily nor quickly, which may lead to rethinking the ways 
information is shared internally and with partners. As a 




“We have to share that with everyone in the EOC, 
on the EOC floor, and in the Unified Coordinating 
Group, but we clearly understand from the exer-
cise that we have to share beyond that. We have 
to share it with our Federal partners, and we also 
have to share it with local jurisdictions. We also 
have to, as we choose the tools that we want to use 
to collect information, to store information, to 
share information, we have to work towards eve-
rybody being able to access the information, be 
able to contribute to this situational awareness 
and to the common operating picture.” (quote 
#07) 
When sharing, the sender might need to label the level 
of confidence and verification of the particular infor-
mation. This could be helpful in the vetting process, since 
the recipients might be able to add and piece information 
elements together, which leads to respective feedback 
and an improved overall assessment. 
Importance of SSA/COP Visualization and Regular 
Status Updates. As indicated above responders suffered 
from either not obtaining necessary and sorely sought 
information or through being flooded by raw data, which 
were of no immediate use but rather presented an addi-
tional obstacle. Pre-incident planning needs to focus on 
identifying means of how data can be meaningfully fil-
tered without losing essential information in the process. 
The problem of information overload, however, will oc-
cur only as long as modern ICTs and networks are fully 
functional during the response, whereas in the case of a 
near-total blackout the problem of not obtaining im-
portant information will prevail. Responders repeatedly 
emphasized the importance of SSA/COP visualization, 
both low- and high-tech, based on interactive charts, sta-
tus boards, and otherwise, which provides better at-a-
glance situational understanding than lengthy narratives. 
The situation map tool used by the National Guard was 
repeatedly mentioned as an excellent example and use-
ful tool for SSA/COP visualization.  
Jurisdictions at all levels managed only in part to ex-
change updated situation reports (SitReps) vertically 
and horizontally. The horizontal information exchange 
between neighboring jurisdictions was found as essen-
tial as the vertical exchange, since critical infrastructure 
damage in a neighboring jurisdiction could massively 
hamper local response efforts, for example, due to road 
closures and the lack of alternate ground transportation 
facilities. Some jurisdictions created hourly incident 
snapshot reports; however, updates were not always 
complete and at times unobtainable, and discrepancies 
between incident status boards, on the one hand, and 
SitReps and snapshots, on the other hand, were ob-
served. Also, SitReps had no standardized formats, and 
some responders found them hard to read. As long as 
modern communication capabilities were available, 
virtual incident briefings were conducted among various, 
although not all, responder levels. As a responder from a 
State Agency puts it,  
“The <State, insertion by authors> Emergency 
Management Division at Camp Murray is sort of 
the central point for information, for mission re-
quest, for damage assessment report, and all other 
reports. They have typically two briefings a day, 
one in the morning and one in the evening, and all 
that information is shared.... and so, all the differ-
ent partners they have, whether it'd be federal, 
state, local, have representatives at the State Emer-
gency Operation Center at Camp Murray. Or they 
can participate either through virtual teleconfer-
ence or phone in those briefings ensuring infor-
mation.” (quote #08) 
However, pre-incident planning needs to anticipate 
that modern communication capabilities in all likelihood 
would not be available for some time in the real incident. 
Damage Assessment and the Important Role of Essen-
tial Elements of Information. Immediately after the simu-
lated catastrophic incident occurred, responders began as-
sessing the damage in terms of critical infrastructures, in 
particular, also relative to the responders’ own capabili-
ties. In so-called windshield surveys Police and Fire pro-
vided initial information, as one City responder describes, 
“They drive around the community looking initially 
for columns of smoke and dust, which give you the 
idea of where's the fire, where's the collapse? The 
utilities are looking at their (unintelligible) systems 
for the telemetry of these waters still flowing, are 
systems still working? Department of Transporta-
tion is out inspecting bridges to find out, do we still 
have critical infrastructure routes?” (quote #09) 
And the responder continues, 
“If fires are broken out in more places than we can 
fight, we'd make the decision where will we fight 
fires, and where will we protect people and how? 
Where have the most people been trapped or in-
jured and are in need of rescue, etc.?” (quote #10) 
The windshield reports fed into the initial and quick 
assessment of damage, which were amended by incoming 
911 calls and other sources of information. More system-
atic damage surveys were conducted based on checklists 
under the name of “Essential Elements of Information.” 
These checklists are hazard-specific planning tools, 
which are used in EOCs for the systematic collection of 
information and its redistribution. The Seattle City EEIs 
list, for example, contained a column for the name of “es-
sential element” itself, for example, “roads and bridges,” 
another column for specific information details regarding 
the essential element, for example, number of bridge in-
spection teams and the list of bridges already inspected 




provider or owner, for example, Seattle Department of 
Transportation, and a column for specifying supporting 
functions and agencies. Other jurisdictions’ EEIs in-
cluded also detailed contact information and infor-
mation dissemination lists. Particularly, in the chaos of 
the real incident, the pre-developed EEI checklists may 
prove invaluable when trying to instill order into the in-
formation collection, management, and dissemination 
process, which would finally lead to establishing a 
SSA/COP. However, unfortunately, far from all juris-
dictions had developed these checklists and standard-
ized processes for information collection and handling. 
As a State responder admits, 
“Basically, that is one of the things that we are 
working on: defining what are the essential ele-
ments of information, then defining how are you 
going about gathering the information? What is 
the repository going to be of the information, and 
then what tools are you using to share the infor-
mation? And writing all of that up in a plan. So 
right now, we have two work groups: one that has 
been a direct result of the Cascadia Rising exer-
cise and that is this, what we are referring to as 
the Situational Awareness Workgroup.” (quote 
#11) 
6. Discussion 
As expected, the Cascadia Rising 2016 uncovered 
numerous vulnerabilities, planning deficiencies, and 
process issues with regard to establishing SSA/COP 
quickly.  
Persisting Known Problems. In a previous study on 
a recent real-world non-catastrophic disaster [30], which 
involved quite a number of individual responders and 
jurisdictions who also partook in the simulated cata-
strophic incident response studied here, already several 
SSA/COP-related issues had been observed and ana-
lyzed, among which the missing standards for infor-
mation sharing, the need for developing hazard-specific 
EEI checklists and contact lists, as well as the lack of 
information integration were identified. The current 
study re-confirmed exactly the unabated persistence of 
these key issues. However, this study on the CR16 exer-
cise helped uncovering additional issues and more detail 
regarding the known problems: 
Need for Standardizing Information Collection, Ver-
ification, and Dissemination Methods. While standard 
protocols for information sharing between and among 
responder units remain a backbone of electronic and pa-
per-based information sharing, the standardization also 
needs to include mechanisms and methods for collection 
(push and/or pull), verification methods and levels (for 
example, confidence levels from unverified, verified in 
part, or fully verified), and dissemination methods and 
formats (for example, standardized SitReps). As much 
as possible electronic method standards and document 
formats should be identical to the paper-based ones, 
which appears as unproblematic with regard to simple 
forms as in FEMA’s ICS forms booklet. Much of any in-
itial SSA/COP revolves around damage assessment. As 
discussed elsewhere the development of detailed hazard-
specific pre-generated checklists on “Essential Elements 
of Information” present an effective handle, which pro-
vides guidance through information collection and dis-
semination regarding assets of critical infrastructures. 
However, while the EEI checklists are a much-needed 
prerequisite, the damage assessment process will not be 
uniform for each and every asset of critical infrastructure. 
Consequently, reviewing and defining these various as-
sessment processes and procedures ex-ante will be an-
other necessary investment into preparedness for a cata-
strophic incident response. 
Rethinking the Information Sharing Paradigm. Re-
sponders take great pride in vetting and verifying infor-
mation before they pass it on or use it for informing re-
sponse efforts. As discussed, this practice effectively pre-
vents suboptimal responses, while the vetting and verify-
ing process can take a long time until completion, which 
may result in losing valuable time. In life-threatening sit-
uations, responders tend to err on the side of caution if 
information is unverified, that is, rather respond than not. 
However, too much time might be lost in the vetting pro-
cess, and as argued before, other response units might 
have complementing information, which can help draw 
the bigger and more complete picture, which in turn 
might also help with identifying information that mean-
while has become obsolete. So, passing on information 
with a status label, which informs the recipient of the vet-
ting status, might be preferable to hoarding and siloing 
[6] information. This change of information sharing prac-
tice and policy may need some effort to implement in-
cluding culture change efforts, since many response units 
have cultivated information sharing anxieties and practice 
information hoarding for one reason or another. Just to be 
sure, it is not suggested here that information, which has 
not been verified, but rather labeled on some lower con-
fidence scale, should ever be shared outside professional 
response units, and certainly never with the general pub-
lic. 
Information Integration and Visualization. The afore-
mentioned previous study on a recent non-catastrophic 
disaster had uncovered the lack of integration in disaster 
information sharing (for example, for reasons of media 
incompatibilities, document format incompatibilities re-
garding text/voice/image, among others) [30]. Separate 
formats basically stayed separate and were not compiled 
into a single whole. Many voice messages were not tran-
scribed nor was their informational essence captured in 




associated with text-based reports. As a result, infor-
mation remained incomplete and distorted. This study, 
as stated before, strongly confirmed this finding. How-
ever, it additionally found that the problem would be 
most effectively overcome if the information, once 
properly integrated, was also adequately visualized. Be 
it on interactive charts (as long as electric power, and 
with it, ICTs and large screens are available), or on pa-
per/whiteboard-based status boards, the visualization of 
important information appears as a highly effective 
means of maintaining SSA/COP inside a response unit 
such as an EOC or also between response units. 
Shift Overlaps for Maintaining SSA/COP as Low-
hanging Fruits. It was surprising to find again the prob-
lem of loss of information and degradation of SSA/COP 
upon shift changes after the previous study. However, 
the exercise involved many more response units than in 
the real-world case from a couple of years before. Quite 
a few units had learned that lesson and conducted shift 
changes in an overlap fashion of two hours or more, so 
that the new shift could gradually and smoothly take 
over without any abruption and loss of essential infor-
mation. As a result, SSA/COP was fully maintained. 
Therefore, shift overlaps should become part of the 
standard procedure. 
The Need for Contingency Planning and Paper-
based Operations. The simulated response mimicked 
the real incident only in part, since the loss of power, 
communication capabilities, networking, and ICTs was 
only practiced for a few hours at best, and in some juris-
dictions was not exercised at all as if the critical infor-
mation infrastructure was invulnerable. Some interview-
ees referred to this approach as the “artificiality of the 
exercise,” which did not sincerely represent the real 
challenge at hand. Unlike the National Guard most ju-
risdictional exercise participants did not consider that up 
to 50 percent of their own personnel might be incapaci-
tated by the catastrophic incident in one way or the 
other, so that the response would be significantly cur-
tailed quantitatively and qualitatively from the get-go. 
As described before, despite these “artificialities” the 
challenges to establishing and maintaining a SSA/COP 
were numerous and grave, and the exercise was very in-
strumental in uncovering these vulnerabilities and defi-
ciencies despite the aforementioned mock in the exer-
cise. In the real case of the incident, however, such con-
venience will be absent. Therefore, the response needs 
to be planned on the basis of a paper-based response for 
an extended period of time. Moreover, and potentially, 
more challenging, while modern communication capa-
bilities and ICT capabilities return to operation, the 
gradual transition from paper to electronic needs to be 
managed, which might be more challenging than antici-
pated. It might be conducive to purpose and goals con-
sidering the establishments of redundant mirror sites 
outside the impact areas, which constantly enter and up-
date information collected by first responders on ground 
zero (even if the paper record arrives and is managed a 
day later). 
However, equally important, as establishing redun-
dant information infrastructures outside the impact and 
response areas before the catastrophic incident happens, 
is the development of contingency plans under the as-
sumption that a major number of professional responders 
and experts would not be available for the response them-
selves. This particular scenario has not been adequately 
regarded overall and relative to SSA/COP. It is clear from 
the Cascadia Rising 2016 exercise that losing a signifi-
cant number of responders would very gravely exacerbate 
the situation.  
7. Conclusion 
This study’s object was to contribute to more deeply 
understanding the SSA/COP-specific challenges during a 
catastrophic-incident response. The study found and dis-
cussed several important new areas, which need attention 
in the response to such an incident. The response to a ca-
tastrophe markedly differs from responses to “regular” 
emergencies and non-catastrophic disasters. Catastrophe 
responses require a high degree of procedural flexibility, 
while maintaining adherence to basic response paradigms 
and principles. The basis for finding an acceptable bal-
ance between the two hinges to a great part upon the qual-
ity of the SSA/COP, which makes further study on the 
subject mandatory. 
With regard to the simulated incident response under 
study, the Washington State CR16 After-Action Report 
[4] bluntly summarizes,  
“The state’s current planning framework and ap-
proach to disaster response is not suitable to a cat-
astrophic-scale incident” (p. 6) 
And further elaborates, 
“The state’s emergency planning meets the re-
sponse requirements for a severe winter storm, 
flooding or wildfire. However, current planning is 
not adequate for catastrophic disasters at the state 
and local jurisdiction levels. The state lacks com-
prehensive catastrophic response plans. Cascadia 
Rising identified an extreme-response environment 
demanding state-interagency activities well beyond 
current operational practice.” (p. 5) 
Along with the previous study, which had already 
identified a number of serious problems in attaining 
SSA/COP in the context of non-catastrophic emergencies 
and disasters, the results and insights from this study fully 
confirm the State’s assessment and add important detail 
with regard to establishing and maintaining SSA/COP un-
der the impact of a catastrophic incident. Not only has the 




and procedures for attainting and maintaining SSA/COP 
in non-catastrophic incidents, but rather increased atten-
tion has to be turned towards the particular needs and 
challenges, when responders have to deal with a catastro-
phe, which does not simply translate into a linear exten-
sion of the identified needs and challenges in non-cata-
strophic incidents. In particular, paper-based, runner-
based, as well as low- or no-technology-based operations 
need to be redeveloped and practiced along with their 
gradual transition to more advanced procedures and 
methods as soon as those become available.  
From the perspective of the State AAR and the in-
sights from this study, it is therefore only consequential 
that FEMA and the Pacific Northwest States (Alaska, Or-
egon, Idaho, and Washington) plan another large-scale 
exercise to be conducted in 2022. That exercise should 
incorporate practicing SSA/COP operations in a blackout 
information environment as well as under the assumption 
of massive initial decimation in local response assets and 
capabilities. Furthermore, adequately mimicking the 
gradual transition from the aforementioned no/low-tech 
response management environment back to high-tech and 
high-speed ICT-supported response operations will re-
main a challenge to exercise planning, since in the real 
case this transition will take an extended period of time, 
which will be difficult to adequately simulate in the rela-
tively short duration of an exercise. Future research will 
accompany and try to contribute to the design and evalu-
ation of the 2022 exercise, in particular, with regard to 
addressing the SSA/COP-related challenges.  
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